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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

permits were first created, no federal regulation required the Corps to
conduct further analysis.
Fourth, Trout Unlimited alleged the Corps violated NEPA in
failing to analyze the proposed construction projects using NEPA
review. Again, the court dismissed the argument, holding NEPA
review occurred at the time of the creation of the NWPs, with the
Corps analyzing a relevant class of activities at the time it issued the
permit. When applying an NWP to a proposed activity, NEPA does not
require further review of the project.
Fifth, Trout Unlimited's claim under the FWCA alleged the Corps
failed to address concerns about the projects' impacts on local trout
species. The court first pointed out the FWCA does not include a
private right of action for citizen suits, but addressed the issue to
determine whether the Corps' actions were arbitrary and capricious,
and thus in violation of the APA. The Corps' regulations require the
agency to give "full consideration" to other agencies' concerns, yet
under FWCA, requirements the Corps can rely on information from
permit applicants in evaluating compliance with FWCA. The court
found while the Fish and Wildlife Service initially expressed concern
over the projects, the permit applicants addressed the concerns in an
Thus, Trout
environmental assessment provided to the Corps.
Unlimited failed to meet its burden of proving the Corps acted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner.
Finally, the court addressed Trout Unlimited's allegation the
Corps' actions violated the NHPA by failing to evaluate possible
impacts on historic properties. Under the NHPA, state historic
preservation offices must assist federal agencies in the review
processes. The Utah State Historic Preservation Office determined the
proposed projects would not affect historic properties. The court
found the Corps' reliance on such determination reasonable, and
dismissed Trout Unlimited's claim under the NHPA.
The court thus denied Trout Unlimited's appeal and motion to
remand agency action, and entered judgment for the Corps.
KatharineJEllison

United States v. Newdunn Assoc., 195 F. Supp. 2d 751 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(holding the United States Army Corps of Engineers' 1986 regulations
expanding the definition of "waters of the United States" and
extending its jurisdiction over these waters exceeded the grant of
authority to the Corps by Congress under the Clean Water Act).
On June 12, 2001, Newdunn Associates ("Newdunn") and its
contractors began discharging fill material onto its property, grading
its property, and excavating ditches on its property. Newdunn
conducted these activities without a permit under section 404 of the
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Clean Water Act ("CWA") or an individual or general Virginia
Protection Permit under sections 62.1-44.15:5 and 62.1-44.5 of the
Virginia Code. The United States filed suit against Newdunn in the
United States District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia. The
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality ("VDEQ") also filed
suit against Newdunn in Virginia State Court for not obtaining state
permits. The VDEQ's action was removed to the United States District
Court and consolidated the two actions against Newdunn because it
found VDEQ had relied on the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
assertion of jurisdiction to bring its claim. At issue was whether the
Corps had jurisdiction over Newdunn's property under the CWA and
its 1986 regulations interpreting the Act.
Newdunn owned a parcel of land in Newport News, Virginia. At
times, run-off generated by rain exited the property through drainage
ditches. The water ran through more than three miles of ditches and
arms of non-navigable runs until it intersected with Stony Run, which
was a navigable-in-fact watercourse. In September 1999, Newdunn
requested and obtained ajurisdictional determination from the Corps.
The determination confirmed Newdunn's property contained thirtyeight acres of non-tidal forested wetlands. Under the Corps' 1986
regulations, the Corps had jurisdiction under the CWA over wetlands
that were sufficiently connected to "waters of the United States." The
September 1999 jurisdictional determination confirmed the Corps had
jurisdiction over the wetlands on Newdunn's property.
The district court, however, found this determination to be
incorrect, holding that the Corps failed to meet its burden under its
1986 regulations of proving the wetlands on Newdunn's property were
sufficiently connected to "waters of the United States" to fall within its
jurisdiction. The Corps argued a "surface water" or "hydrological"
connection existed between the wetlands on the property and "waters
of the United States." However, the court rejected this argument
because the 1986 regulations make no mention of such connections.
The court also reasoned that upholding the Corps' argument would
lead to arbitrary findings ofjurisdiction.
The court found even if the Corps had met its burden, the 1986
regulations exceeded the 1972 Congressional grant of authority in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs. The Corps first
promulgated regulations for the CWA in 1974 under authority granted
by Congress. The Corps revised its regulations in 1975, 1977, and
1986. These revisions continually expanded the definition of "waters
of the United States" and consequently, expanded the CWA's
jurisdiction over these waters. Prior to SWANCC, courts generally
allowed the CWA's jurisdiction to expand under the Corps'
regulations. However, SWANCC limited the Corps' jurisdiction under
the CWA to actually navigable waters, their tributaries, and wetlands
adjacent to each. This limitation is consistent with the Corps' original
1974 interpretation of its jurisdiction under the CWA. Thus, because
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the wetlands on Newdunn's property were not adjacent to navigable
waters, the court found the Corps had no jurisdiction over the
property.
Lastly, the court found sections 61.1-44.5 and 62.1-44.15:15 of the
Virginia Code were coextensive with the CWA because they based their
state jurisdiction on that of the CWA and likewise defined "wetlands."
Also, the VDEQ's actions indicate it consistently based its jurisdiction
over Newdunn's property on the Corps' jurisdiction over the property.
Therefore, since the Virginia statute and the CWA were coextensive,
and because VDEQ relied on the Corps' jurisdiction for its own
jurisdiction-given the court's finding the Corps had no jurisdiction
over Newdunn's property-the court held VDEQ also had no
jurisdiction over Newdunn's property. As such, the court entered
judgment for Newdunn.
Kate Osborn
Lands Council v. Vaught, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (E.D. Wash. 2002)
(holding that absent a finding that injunctive relief would cause
irreparable harm, a permanent injunction is the proper remedy for
violation of the National Environmental Protection Act's procedural
requirements).
In late 1998 and early 1999, the United States Forest Service
("Forest Service") prepared an Environmental Impact Statement to
address a Douglas fir bark beetle outbreak and various ecosystem
imbalances in the Colville National Forest ("CNF") and Idaho
Panhandle National Forest ("IPNF"). The Forest Service released the
Final Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS") on June 14, 1999, and
adopted some of its proposals. The resulting Douglas Fir Bark Beetle
Project ("Project") would impact 19,000 acres of forested land in the
IPNF and 4,300 acres in the CNF. The Project called for logging 145
million board-feet of trees.
The Lands Council administratively appealed a Forest Service's
decision to implement the Project, however, the Appeal Deciding
Officer denied it in September 1999. The Lands Council then
brought suit against the Forest Service in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington, alleging violations of the
Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), National Environmental
Protection Act ("NEPA"), National Forest Management Act ("NFMA")
and the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The district court denied their two
motions for preliminary injunction, but the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals issued a temporary injunction pending appeal. The Lands
Council then amended its original complaint, which is the subject in
the instant case.
The district court considered this amended
complaint, ruling on cross motions for summary judgment brought by
the Lands Council and the Forest Service Chief. The Lands Council

